IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

In re:)	
)	Chapter 11
YELLOW CORPORATION, et al.,)	
)	Case No. 23-11069 (CTG)
Debtors.)	

DECLARATION OF WILLIAM D. SULLIVAN IN SUPPORT OF MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLANS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

- I, William D. Sullivan, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), declare the following under penalty of perjury:
- I am an attorney and partner with Sullivan Hazeltine Allinson LLC, counsel for the Funds¹ in the above-captioned action.
- 2. Attached hereto as **Exhibit A** is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the June 12, 2024 hearing held before the Court in the above-captioned action.
- 3. Attached hereto as **Exhibit B** is a true and correct copy of documents produced by Debtors during discovery in the above-captioned action that are Bates stamped YELLOW-MEPP_0042745 YELLOW-MEPP_0042747.
- 4. Attached hereto as **Exhibit C** is a true and correct copy of a document produced by Debtors during discovery in the above-captioned action that is Bates stamped YELLOW-MEPP_0042888 YELLOW-MEPP_0042893.

¹ The "Funds" are ten multiemployer pension plans: New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and Retirement Fund, Road Carriers Local 707 Pension Fund, Teamsters Local 641 Pension Plan, Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and Employers Pension Fund, Management Labor Pension Fund Local 1730, International Association of Machinists Motor City Pension Fund, Mid-Jersey Trucking Industry & Teamsters Local 701 Pension and Annuity Fund, Teamsters Local 617 Pension Fund, Trucking Employees of North Jersey Pension Fund, and Freight Drivers and Helpers 557 Pension Fund.

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5. Attached hereto as **Exhibit D** is a true and correct copy of documents produced by Debtors during discovery in the above-captioned action that are Bates stamped YELLOW-MEPP_0042738 – YELLOW-MEPP_0042739.

6. Attached hereto as **Exhibit E** is a true and correct excerpted copy of the deposition transcript of Darren Hawkins taken on June 7, 2024.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on June 28, 2024.

/s/ William D. Sullivan
William D. Sullivan

EXHIBIT A

1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT				
2	DIS	TRICT OF DELAWARE			
3	IN RE:	. Chapter 11 . Case No. 23-11069 (CTG)			
4	YELLOW CORPORATION, et al.,	. (Jointly Administered)			
5	et al.,	. (Utility Administered)			
6		. Courtroom No. 7			
7	Debtors.	824 North Market StreetWilmington, Delaware 19801			
8		. Wednesday, June 12, 2024			
9		12:00 p.m.			
10	TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE CRAIG T. GOLDBLATT				
11	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE				
12	APPEARANCES:				
13	For the Debtors:	Allyson Smith, Esquire KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP			
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15	East MEN. Darehmana				
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25	Proceedings recorded by electronic sound recording, transcript produced by transcription service.				

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(Proceedings commenced at 12:00 p.m.)

THE COURT: Good morning, all -- or good afternoon, or maybe good exactly noon. This is Judge Goldblatt. We are on the record in In Re Yellow Corporation, which is Case No. 23-11069.

We are proceeding by Zoom because I believe all we have is a discovery dispute and perhaps an update on status, but why don't I stop talking and pass the virtual podium to Ms. Smith to let us know what is on the agenda for this hearing. Ms. Smith.

MS. SMITH: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Allyson Smith, Kirkland & Ellis, for the debtors.

You are correct that the only item on today's agenda is the discovery dispute which we do not believe the debtors are implicated in, but I am happy to give a very quick update as to the other two matters that are not going forward today.

The Realterm Landlord matters we do believe we have resolved those and we are working with parties to finalize the terms that we expect to submit in the very near, near term.

The second item is, what we refer to as, the email destruction motion. That has been adjourned until later this month. I also believe that we have a means to address what, otherwise, would resolve all of the objectors concerns, but

1 we also have a (indiscernible) to confirm that. 2 THE COURT: Okay. Very well. That is very helpful. I appreciate that. 3 4 I guess I am happy, unless there is anything else, 5 to hear from the parties with respect to the discovery 6 matter. 7 Mr. Winston. 8 MR. WINSTON: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Eric Winston, Quinn Emanuel, on behalf of MFN Partners. 9 10 Your Honor, there are two dueling discovery matters. One is our motion to quash depositions and then the 11 other is Pension Funds motion to compel production of 12 13 documents, though they also raised in their letter the 14 deposition. So, in many ways they are truly dueling. 15 I thought it might make sense, unless Your Honor 16 has any views differently, that I explain what we believe to 17 be the issues and our arguments, not repeating what is in the 18 papers, and then presumably the Fund will do the same as 19 well, then however this goes this goes. I thought that might 20 make sense since this is really a mirror image of discovery 21 papers. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Meehan, any objection to 23 proceeding in that fashion?

MR. MEEHAN: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Very well then. Mr. Winston, you can

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proceed.

MR. WINSTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

We tried to do this in our response letter to their letter, the one filed on June 10th, Docket 3626, that there are really two substantive matters at issue. The first was they called document requests one and two, and also, they seek depositions on it, relates to prepetition internal valuations, projections, analysis and the like that MFN had relating both to pension withdrawal liability as well as any projected distributions that might occur in a restructuring whether in court or out of court. They seek both documents and depositions for that.

As laid out in the papers, and certainly the Funds counsel knows this has been out position for months, is we believe all that is irrelevant. It's irrelevant to what is actually this proceeding, which is a claim objection by the debtors against the Funds. And whatever MFN has -- and I will get to the proprietary nature in a second, but whatever MFN actually has cannot, under any circumstance, either approve or disprove the allowance of these claims. It is truly irrelevant.

They served these document subpoenas, which started this, even before MFN had joined the objections.

They were in response to the debtors objections. We said this all along, how could it possibly make a difference whatever

or MFN or for that matter any other creditor or shareholder ever think internally.

One of their responses has been, well, you might have had communications with the debtors and we want to have notes to those communications. I learned earlier this week that the debtors did, in fact, produce to the Funds any communications on these topics to the Funds actually prepetition and post-petition. This dispute is solely about prepetition. This dispute is totally about prepetition. From what I understand is the universe of documents, like less then a handful, if any, that is consistent with what we thought which is there isn't going to be anything, but it doesn't change the view by everybody, at least as far as I know, objecting to the Funds claims it literally makes no difference. It cannot make a difference to what is allowed or not, what MFN ever thought at all.

We repeatedly asked for authorities to support their views and even in the letter and the response they have identified none. Part of the reason for that is its pretty universal at this stage that bankruptcy courts simply do not allow discovery into opposing parties internal views of the value in almost every circumstance. Its certainly a claims objection can fall within that category. We cited cases, we cited Your Honor's earlier ruling regarding lease assumption issues. It's the same analysis; its simply irrelevant and

its obviously very prejudicial the parties to be forced to reveal what they think.

The second issue, I think, is even more bizarre and that is they have sought discovery of whether MFN relied upon statements by the Funds prepetition in acquiring the stock of Yellow as an argument against the debtors reliance on whatever statements were made by the Funds prepetition that supports their claim of objections. When we heard this, we said, again, whatever MFN might have relied upon is truly irrelevant to whether the claims should be allowed or not. The debtors reliance, at best, is at issue, but if you have any concerns we are not going to testify to any of this stuff.

They seem to accept that for documents because they need proposed stipulations and after a little bit of modifications, which they accepted, we have a pre-stipulation that confirms MFN at the trial in August or September is never going to introduce any evidence and the debtors are not going to introduce any evidence of MFN relying on its irrelevant, which makes sense, its an easy give. If there was any concerns about that we put that to rest. That actually did resolve the document requests that they had sought.

Thus, it was very surprising to us they still want to take a deposition. I cannot understand what is the purpose of it at this stage when whatever they would happen

1 to get in a deposition, we would never be able to 2 (indiscernible) anyway. So, I promised not to repeat what is in the papers, so I am hoping I am honoring that promise, but 3 4 that is the sum and substance of the argument. There is 5 simply no possible way whatever they are seeking will ever 6 make a difference to whether the claims should be allowed or 7 not. 8 Unless Your Honor has any questions, I rest. THE COURT: No, I don't. Thank you, Mr. Winston. 9 10 I am happy to hear from Mr. Meehan or whomever. I presumed it was you because you have argued before me on much 11 of these matters, but I don't mean to slight anyone else who 12 intends to make the argument on your side. 13 14 MR. MEEHAN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Meehan. 15 Actually, Mr. Herink is going to lead the argument from 16 Central States and the MEPPs that I represent. 17 THE COURT: Got it. My apologies, Mr. Herink.

Let me give you the opportunity to be heard and apologies.

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MR. HERINK: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you very much. This is my first time before you; although, I have been more of a, you know, long time listener first time caller.

THE COURT: I don't have quite that type of audience reach, but I appreciate it.

MR. HERINK: I am going to go through very briefly

what we consider our argument to be and then in the process of that hopefully respond to a few things that Mr. Winston said.

So, I think one thing that MFN and Central States agree on is there are only two bucket categories that, or whatever you want to say, are discovery requested issues here. Let me lay our what those steps are.

The first is document requests one and two, limited in the ways we noticed in our May 31st letter to the Court, and deposition topics one and two. Those are both in the same ballpark stating the same thing. Specifically, they seek documents and testimony regarding prepetition analysis and predications about the withdrawal liability potentially owed by the debtors and prepetition analysis and predications regarding any potential distributions to equity holders like MFN.

This first set of documents is relevant for two reasons. First, Mr. Winston focused on internal MFN documents. We certainly are seeking that as part of what we are seeking. Those internal documents and other documents that don't involve debtors, analysis and predictions that were not sent to or received by debtors, but instead were just internal MFN analysis and predictions are analysis and predictions shared provided by others to MFN. These are relevant to debtors arguments including the internal

analysis.

THE COURT: So, Mr. Herink, can I stop you there because I saw the discussion in the papers about equitable arguments and I confess I was a little puzzled by it. So, let me just share with you my overarching view of what this case is about as I see it and I don't know if that will obviate the concern.

I do see that the debtor -- so, look, as I understand the dispute the statute imposes withdraw liability, right, for an employer's, you know, allocable share of unfunded pension -- I'm sorry, of vested benefits, the unfunded vested benefits, right. I understand there is a question that I have got to resolve about whether in light of the American Rescue Plan Act there are or are not unfunded vested benefits.

The debtors, you know, do sort of make, at some level, the argument in which they say the Funds would be compensated twice for the same injury if they both get the congressional grant and they get withdraw liability. Now, at least as I see that issue if its relevant at all, and I'm not sure it is, its relevant only to the question of congressional intent. I have got a statutory question. I am not here to decide who I think is -- who if I were king, I would decide should get the money.

I've got a statutory question, Congress has

written words, I've got to read those words and to the extent, under applicable law, I should take account of the applicable regulations then I will address those. But it is not about what I think is too much or what I think is fair. So, as I -- I am not sure what you are describing as the equitable argument that the debtor makes is relevant at all, but if it is its relevant only to triangulate at what Congress would have intended and that is all.

So, assume for a moment that is how I view my job and the question that I have got to decide. If that is the case what is then the relevance of this first category of materials that you are seeking from MFN?

MR. HERINK: Yes. I understand your point to be that there isn't really an as applied equitable argument that debtors could make. There can be some type of, I guess, equitable argument regarding what Congress intended. That is aligned, I think, with our view of the case, but respectfully, Your Honor, this issue will probably be appealed up to decision makers of the other decision makers, is my first point, that may view the issue differently and may give credence to debtors equitable arguments.

Secondly, debtors are going to make those equitable arguments in their papers and we want to have all the ammunition and facts that we need in order to reply to those regardless of whether Your Honor is going to take those

very seriously or not.

of the world is every case has one Judge at a time and while that case is before that Judge that Judge's job is to call balls and strikes to the best of their lights based on what is in front of them. So, its true someone might disagree. If they disagree, I will get reversed and I will deal with it. It presumably will come back or it won't come back. While it's in front of me I think my charge is to do the best I can by my lights.

Okay. I want to give you the chance to make your argument, but I also want to be clear about how I'm thinking about things to the extent that is helpful to the parties.

MR. HERINK: It did help, Your Honor. Thank you.

So, continuing on with this first set of documents. You know, even internal MFN analysis, (indiscernible), we contend would be relevant because the debtors are claiming that from an equitable perspective Central States recovering the full amount of its withdraw liability, or I guess having a claim for the full amount of its withdraw liability, would be inequitable to equity holders like MFN because it would result in them not recovering anything.

So, we think, again, setting aside the strength of that argument, whether Your Honor agrees with it, we think

that in order to clearly and fairly respond to that argument we need to know what MFN's expectations were and their knowledge; you know, what information they had prior to the petition date filed because if MFN clearly expected to get nothing in this case, we believe that is relevant to the equities. It's a different argument if MFN went into this case with eyes closed not knowing, you know, that they could potentially recover nothing versus eyes wide open knowing that it was a long shot for them to ever recover anything.

I also want to stress that these internal MFN analysis aren't the only thing we seek. We also are seeking analysis and predications that involve debtors. So, if MFN sent, you know, a prediction or analysis to debtors, or the representatives or vice versa, debtor sent one to MFN, we think that is relevant.

THE COURT: Mr. Herink, Mr. Winston represented earlier that you served that request on the debtors and that the debtors responded by saying they will provide responsive documents, is that correct?

MR. HERINK: We did serve a request for these documents on debtors. They produced, I believe, a small subset of what we requested, but we are requesting more in line with our original request. So, they have not yet responded as to whether they are going to produce those additional documents.

THE COURT: Help me with this, explain to me why - let's say the debtors create a piece of paper that -- just
explain to me the theory of the relevance. Imagine there was
communication -- and I am not -- to the extent they produced
it I am not encouraging them to revisit it, but I am
struggling with the theory of relevance in the first instance
of communication between the debtor and its equity holder as
it relates to what these withdraw liabilities are. Explain
to me how that effects what the unfunded vested benefits look
like.

MR. HERINK: I don't believe it effects what the unfunded vested benefits look like. Let me answer that question straightforwardly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HERINK: I think the relevance is something else. Specifically, debtors are making an equitable argument that we can't recover, you know, the full amount of withdraw liability. The law is clear that a party seeking to have equity applied must have fell back equitably.

THE COURT: I understand that, but if I am -look, I am going to be evenhanded here and if I am going to
entertain the argument from the debtor then you are going to
have a chance to respond to it. If the argument to which you
are seeking discovery to respond to is one that is dead in
the water, then I am not going to -- so, you know, I am going

to manage the litigation so that we direct it towards what actually matters, not, you know, a go down rabbit holes.

So, look, the debtor is on. I am happy to hear from them, but the notion that in resolving this claims dispute I should be doing anything other then answering the statutory question like doesn't resonate with me. The notion that like I as a matter of moral philosophy should decide how much money should be given on the one hand to the Funds and on the other hand to the debtors estate based on my abstract vision of justice isn't the job that I have.

I am applying the statute in light of the facts.

I am not saying that there is no role. Look, again, as I said before, on the question of -- if the debtor wants to make an argument about congressional intent, you know, I am not cutting that off at the pass; although, I think what really matters is what Congress meant in 1980 when it passed the Multi-Employer Pension Act Amendments.

In any event, I don't see the notion that this is MFN's expectation of the debtors expectation about what distribution to its various constituents would be as bearing on this question. Look, if the debtor wants to say, no, we have got a real argument, we intend to make it and here is what it is they should jump in because I am generally inclined not to give you this discovery, but what is good for the goose is good for the gander. I am going to be even

1 handed about this.

So, Ms. Smith, let me hear from you. I am suggesting if the Funds suggestion of the debtors intent is correct, I am talking about narrowing what is at issue. Would I be wrong to do it that way.

MS. SMITH: Thank you, Your Honor.

The debtors (indiscernible) going forward with a legal unfairness argument. As you already acknowledged, when the Funds include the special funding assistance they did so because they made the statement that they expected to receive zero on account of withdraw liability. So, I think (indiscernible) argument is more of an estoppel argument. I do not disagree with Your Honor.

THE COURT: So, by estoppel argument I want to understand sort of what you -- so, it's based on their statements, and they made statements to Congress to whom?

MS. SMITH: I believe it was to PBGC and other governmental authorities when they were applying for the bailout. You know, in our view that's double dipping, but our arguments and our position is not, as I said, an unfair -

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Herink, I hear your point. I don't think -- well, let me -- my initial reaction is I think that is -- that that point is different from the abstract one that you are suggesting which is it's just

too much money and, therefore, unfair. So, I don't really see the discovery you are seeking as necessary to respond in fairness to that argument, but let me give you a chance to explain why I am wrong.

MR. HERINK: If you don't mind, Your Honor, and you can totally say this is out of line, if debtors could confirm on the record that their only equitable argument is an equitable estoppel argument that may be useful in helping to resolve all of this.

THE COURT: Ms. Smith.

MS. SMITH: Again, I don't want to speak too much out of turn and I don't necessarily want to give away the legal strategy and argument that we continue to work on, but I don't want to limit the --

THE COURT: All right. Well, that is -- look, the point is not to put on the spot or trick you. That said, at the end of the day if I rule that you can't have this discovery, I am going to be evenhanded in my application of the principle. So, if you start hearing -- if I deny you this discovery and then we get to trial and then you start hearing from them lines of argument as to which you think that you were denied a fair opportunity to respond because of my ruling you will be entitled to be heard on that and maybe I shut down an argument that they would have intended to make.

To me, based on what I understand about the case there isn't anything that I see as relevant that the debtor could be arguing as to which what you are seeking would be responsive. So, at the moment, again I will hear you out, I am inclined to grant the motion to quash and to deny the motion to compel as it relates to this category of materials and carry that thread the rest of the way through the fabric.

So, if it means that you have an argument at trial that I should not hear some argument because I have deprived you of your chance to respond to it you will have a chance to say that when we get there.

MR. HERINK: Thank you, Your Honor. Just on this first category of documents I understand we are setting aside the second category which is deposition testimony on topics three and four, and we will get to that in a minute. Let me take one chance to perhaps change your mind here.

THE COURT: Please, that is what we are here for.

MR. HERINK: Yes. So, an equitable estoppel argument is still an equitable argument. If debtors are able to establish every element of their equitable estoppel argument, their prima facie element, it would still be relevant whether debtors are acting equitably because our view would be debtors cannot assert an equitable argument even if they can establish all the elements of it if they themselves are not acting equitably.

THE COURT: So, tell me what they are doing -- on your theory, what are you going to find that establishes that their conduct is inequitable.

MR. HERINK: Yes. Our theory, although I'm not going to say we're wedded to it, but it's something that we believe may very well be the case is that debtors, at the behest of MFN, their primary shareholder, the shareholder that has control of the company -- because keep in mind that treasury doesn't vote. Treasury is in a voting trust and they vote proportion with everybody else.

So, its important to keep in mind that in effect MFN controls the debtors. Our belief is that MFN and the debtors are working together, we are not sure who came up with this idea, but we believe MFN and the debtors are working together to take a very aggressive scorched earth litigation approach to the Funds claims because succeeding on that and knocking out Central States claims and the claims of the other Funds, which are also substantial, is, as a practical matter, and the equity committee pointed this out in their exclusivity filing, that as a practical matter it's the only way that equity will be in the money here.

THE COURT: Mr. Herink, I hear you and I understand your point. I don't think that that bears on the claims allowance dispute that is in front of me that the claims allowance dispute isn't about their motivation. This

is a balls and strikes question about applying the law of the facts. Their motivation, if you are right that they are improperly, you know, serving the interest of equity in a way that is harmful to other constituencies that bears on the exclusivity motion. You're right, its part of the argument that the creditors committee made, but I have decided that.

If you were to file a motion to appoint a Chapter 11 Trustee and wanted this discovery, I am not encouraging that, but I'm not saying it's irrelevant to any issue that might ever be in front of me, but as to the issue that is, in fact, in front of me I don't think its relevant. So, I hear you. Again, I don't want to cut you short, but I don't see how the points you are making bear on the allowance or the disallowance of the claim.

MR. HERINK: I think I see which way the winds are blowing, Your Honor, but let me perhaps --

THE COURT: There is nothing unwise about telling me that I'm wrong. So, you won't hurt my feelings, I promise.

MR. HERINK: Thank you for that. The claims allowance process will inherently involve a determination as to whether debtors equitable estoppel argument applies because that is true, the claims allowance process does rope in the question of whether debtors are acting equitably. That is all I will say on that.

THE COURT: Okay. I hear you. Why don't we -- if there is anything else you want to make on this category let me give you that opportunity, but otherwise, it might make sense to move to the next category of materials.

Actually, before we get there, Mr. Herink, let me

-- there is also -- Mr. Winston also made, with respect to

the first category, the sort of narrower but pretty powerful

point that in general we are highly reluctant to allow

discovery into internal valuation analysis in any event. You

know, the debtors asked me for the landlords internal

valuation documents because they thought it would be helpful

in the dispute we had over the assumption motion and my

ruling there was I know why you want those, but we just don't

allow discovery of those kinds of materials period.

Isn't that another reason? I don't know if that applies to every piece of paper that you are asking for, but doesn't that -- isn't that an independent reason to deny most of the discovery you are seeking?

MR. HERINK: I don't think so, Your Honor. We touched on this a bit in our opposition to the motion to quash. I agree there is a rule, more or less, that valuations are done by creditors, shareholders or anything equivalent to what is here is not going to be allowed for the purpose of showing value. We are not seeking this for the purpose of --

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THE COURT: So, the reason for the rule that prohibits discovery is that once you get someone else's internal valuation analysis you basically can figure out their reserve price for negotiations over resolution and its not fair for one side to basically engineer the other sides internal analysis of where their prepared to resolve a dispute. So, that is, at least, in part the rational for prohibiting it. It's not just a restriction on the use of the documents. It's a restriction on obtaining the documents because of the enormous risk of prejudice that one could suffer if the other side -- if a litigation opponent obtained 11 one's internal analysis of the dispute in front of the Court. 12 MR. HERINK: On that point let me say this: we are going to enter into a confidentiality agreement with MFN to the extent necessary. THE COURT: Yeah, but it's not about your distributing it to third parties, its about your having it. 17 MR. HERINK: Yes, but I believe that the statement you just made assumes that we would be directly negotiating 20 with MFN on these issues. THE COURT: Okay. 22 MR. HERINK: It's the committee that would be 23 negotiating (indiscernible). THE COURT: I hear you. I understand your point.

Let me allow you to proceed to the next point.

MR. HERINK: Thank you, Your Honor. Again, parties agree what the second category is as well, its topics three and four of the deposition subpoena. Here we are really just looking to find out and really confirm that there were not any statements relating to withdraw liability by the Funds that MFN is relying on or that MFN relied on.

As for the relevance of this, again, debtors have discussed how they're making equitable estoppel arguments. The contours of that argument, you know, based on responses to contention interrogatories that we have received have not really been fleshed out. Debtors have simply said, you know, not exclusively, the federal government relied on Central States statements. So, it's a very real possibility that there is some type of argument the debtors are making but have not yet disclosed that MFN relied on Central States arguments.

THE COURT: All right. Look, let me tell you this, the same principle applies. If I don't give you these documents, I am not going to hear at trial evidence of MFN's reliance. Again, I am happy to -- if the debtor wants to make that argument they should jump in and tell me that I am prejudicing their case by limiting the discovery, but I can't think of why -- this is a dispute -- I mean, the debtor is a legal entity.

I understand it's got constituencies, but I am not

sure why a shareholders reliance would alter the rights of
the debtor unless they were acting as an agent of the debtor.

To the extent they were acting as an agent of the debtor you
would get that discovery, I think, from the debtor. So, I
really don't see the relevance either of an argument the
debtor would be making and, therefore, the need for you to
have discovery in order to respond to it.

MR. HERINK: Yes. I agree that as a facial matter its not relevant. This is more just a matter of covering ourselves because we don't know exactly what debtors are --

THE COURT: I completely understand that. Look, it's your job to make sure that you are not surprised at trial and, therefore, to make your record by seeking the discovery and have them tell you no and have me rule no and, therefore, you are protected against unfair surprise. So, I am not faulting anyone for the fact that we are here with this. I am only sharing my effort to resolve it according to, sort of, usual principles.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$ HERINK: Let me just have one more point on this if I may.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HERINK: On Friday we told debtors, look, topics three and four should be an even knockout. All MFN would need to do is stipulate that it didn't rely on any statements of any of the funds relating to withdraw

liability. MFN has refused to give that to us which kind of raises our antenna that there may be something that we are not getting and the equitable estoppel argument would turn to

THE COURT: So, Mr. Herink, this is the point about corporate separateness that I was eluding to. If MFN relied on a statement that it made an investment, MFN -- you know, its true that they can participate in the claims allowance hearing, but their rights in that regard are entirely derivative of the debtors. They don't have an independent right. They have a right that is purely derivative of the debtors.

So, if they relied on a statement in making an investment decision and it turns out that -- you know, I'm not sure why that in the absence of the debtors reliance I am not sure it moves the needle on claims allowance. I am not even sure that the debtors reliance on the statement -- we will come back to that when we get there, but I don't -- look, you are a hundred percent right that if I don't give you these documents, I will not hear from any one at trial that the claims should be disallowed because MFN relied on a statement that was made by the Funds.

I do think that part of the job of the Court in discovery disputes is to manage the cost of litigation by cutting off, sort of, rabbit holes early on and this seems to

me to be a rabbit hole. So, I am inclined to disallow the discovery and that has whatever consequence it has in terms of narrowing the available arguments at trial.

MR. HERINK: Thank you very much, Your Honor. I do want to give Mr. Meehan an opportunity to speak. I only represent Central States and he represents the other Funds and he may have additional things to bring up.

THE COURT: Very well. Mr. Meehan.

MR. MEEHAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Very briefly, Your Honor, I would say that the discussion today on the record on this issue, the back and forth, and clarifications coming from all sides has been very helpful. I think now we have a much better understanding of the limits and the evenhandedness.

With that, Your Honor, I am satisfied other then to note that I did hear the debtor, you know, refer to an equitable estoppel argument and certain statements that that type of argument has only been raised with respect to a couple of points, not all. We can get into that in much more detail later. So, I have nothing to add other than really, Your Honor, thank you for the discussion. I think it's been very helpful.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Meehan.

So, Ms. Smith, before I rule, I just want to make sure I'm being fair to you. I don't mean to put you on the

spot. I appreciate that you are not a movant here, but the necessary fact is that when you are dealing with what is essentially the scope of third party discovery the scope of the discovery you allow against a third party -- and here I am -- while MFN is a party in interest that has the right to appear and be heard, you know, my view is that that right is in a derivative capacity and that for the purposes of this dispute MFN in its actual own capacity is effectively in the shoes of a third party.

The resolution for disputes of third-party discovery will necessarily bear on what the Court thinks is relevant to the trial. So, I have heard you say you intend to make an argument about equitable estoppel, and we will deal with that when we get there, is there -- do you have any other concerns that -- because I am going to be evenhanded and by cutting off this discovery to the extent, you know, we find ourselves at trial and you're making an argument or your colleagues are making an argument as to which the Funds have a fair point that their unable fully to respond because I cut off discovery do you have any concern about, basically, the consequences of this ruling? Of a ruling that would basically deny the motion to compel and grant the motion to quash?

MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

1 | MR. WINSTON: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WINSTON: This is Eric Winston for MFN. May I just -- I know you are going to rule, can I -- I just want to state a couple of things on the record.

THE COURT: Of course. This is my job to give the parties a chance to be heard. So, please do.

MR. WINSTON: Very quickly. So, thank you for your commentary and hopefully your commentary can be reflected in your ruling. I will say literally everything you said in your commentary was raised in the meet and confer. So, I am glad to hear Mr. Meehan say there is clarifications. This is exactly what we have been telling them since March or -- whenever the meet and confer was that is when we first raised these points. So, none of this is surprising to me.

Number two, we will stand by the stipulations at trial which will confirm there will be no MFN statements introduced at trial for reliance by anybody. So, that is -- we are sticking by that. So, they have exactly what they were searching for.

I want to say one more thing, because I just heard Mr. Herink say it, he said on Friday they asked for an additional stipulation. We did not include that in our papers because that was sent to us under Rule 408 which we honored.

I just want to make it very clear I'm a little disappointed that he's surprised by that, but just to be clear the reason why we did not agree to that stipulation is because its already been given to them and what was agreed to in the stipulations that are in our motion to quash. I will say no more.

THE COURT: I don't think that any of that requires, you know, further elaboration.

Let me just say I am going to grant the motion to quash and deny the motion to compel for the reasons suggested. I am of the view that the material sought is irrelevant. I -- you know, to the extent the argument is that its necessary to respond to an equitable argument I don't think that the question in this case is an equitable question. I think it's a legal question about how to make sense of the words Congress wrote and if applicable the regulations and how those apply to the on the ground facts.

The Court isn't going to entertain an argument that basically asks the Court on principles of equity to grant -- to allow or disallow the claim. It's under Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code and applicable non-bankruptcy law. This is not an equitable question, it's a legal question. So, therefore, the request as to equity at large are inapposite to the dispute and, therefore, irrelevant.

Again, I do understand the debtor intends to make,

what strikes me as, a more focused equitable estoppel argument. I don't have a view on the merits of that, but that will be what it will be. I don't think this discovery, as sought, responds to that.

So, that is my ruling. We will deal with to the extent any of the funds wants to make an argument at trial that some argument that is being made that it should in some form or fashion preclude some argument that is being made I will hear you then. I do think that it makes sense to narrow the dispute before the Court to the one that I believe is before me. I do think that the pursuit of, sort of, these concerns about equity at large are a side show and that in the interest of efficiency we ought to cut that off at the pass.

So, that is my ruling. I guess it would make sense if the parties don't mind submitting an appropriate order under certification reflecting that ruling. We will enter that order. Obviously, if to the extent future disputes arise you all know how to find me.

Anything else that I can do to be helpful to the parties?

MR. WINSTON: Nothing from MFN, Your Honor.

MS. SMITH: Nothing from the debtors, Your Honor.

MR. HERINK: Nothing from Central States. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MEEHAN: Nothing from the MEPPs. Thank you, Judge. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Meehan. Thanks to all of the parties. I think these letters and motions were presented clearly and helpfully. I appreciate the manner in which the issues were teed up. So, my thanks to all of you for that. With that we are adjourned. Thank you. (Proceedings concluded at 12:46 p.m.)

CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability. /s/ Tracey J. Williams June 12, 2024 Tracey J. Williams, CET-914 Certified Court Transcriptionist For Reliable

Filed Under Seal

EXHIBIT B

Filed Under Seal

EXHIBIT C

Filed Under Seal

EXHIBIT D

EXHIBIT E

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Page 1
           IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
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                FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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     IN RE:
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     YELLOW CORPORATION, et al., ) Case No. 23-11069
 5
                                   ) (CTG)
              Debtors.
 6
                                   ) RE: Docket
                                   ) No. 2157
 7
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 9
                  The remote Zoom Rule 30(b)(6)
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     deposition of DARREN HAWKINS, called for
11
     examination, taken pursuant to the Federal Rules
12
     of Civil Procedure of the United States District
13
     Courts pertaining to the taking of depositions,
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     taken before CAROLYN J. HAWKES, C.S.R., within and
15
     for the State of Illinois, on the 7th day of June,
     2024, at the hour of 8:00 a.m. CST.
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         Mr. Uzo Dike, Kirkland & Ellis.
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Page 11 to swear in our first witness. 1 2 THE COURT REPORTER: And everyone stipulates that the witness can be sworn in remotely, correct? MR. SULLIVAN: Correct. 5 THE COURT REPORTER: Mr. Hawkins, would 6 7 you please state your name and current location, just city and state, for the 8 9 record? 10 THE WITNESS: Darren Hawkins. Selmer, 11 Tennessee. 12 (WHEREUPON, the witness was 13 first remotely duly sworn.) DARREN HAWKINS, 14 15 called as a witness herein, having been first remotely duly sworn, was examined and testified as 16 follows: 17 18 EXAMINATION BY MR. SULLIVAN: 19 20 Good morning, Mr. Hawkins. Thank you 21 for taking time to be with us here today. My name 22 is Daniel Sullivan. I am an attorney for the Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas 23 24 Pension Fund, which I'm going to refer to by the

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Yellow companies could not have undertaken such an

2 effort with PBGC if the Yellow companies

3 determined that they wished to do so at the time?

4 MR. ESSER: Object to form. You can

5 answer if you can.

BY THE WITNESS:

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- A. That question, I think I'm just going to have to have you ask it again.
- 9 BY MR. MEEHAN:
- Q. Sure. Let me ask it and I'll try to tighten it.
 - A. Yup.
 - Q. Can you think of any reason why -- if the Yellow companies had wanted to work with PBGC on what the regulation should say about recognizing the special financial assistance, is there any reason why you could not have done that if you wished to do so?
 - A. At a company our size and with as many employees we had many times the Department of Labor, Department of Transportation would reach out to us and we would provide our opinion, other things on that.

If that happened from the PBGC, I'm

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- not aware of it, but that's a situation I could think of, that, you know, it's not uncommon at all for even the White House to reach out to a company like ours, you know, their National Economic Council, other things from that regard, but that's the best answer I can give to I think what you're trying to ask.
- Q. Okay. And I think I can wrap up by just making sure I've got you is -- so although communications with government agencies about regulations that might concern Yellow were not uncommon, you don't know of any such communication between the Yellow companies and PBGC about this special financing assistance regulation. Did I get that right?
 - MR. ESSER: Object to form. You can answer.
- 18 BY THE WITNESS:

- A. Yeah, not that I recall or that I am aware of.
 - MR. MEEHAN: Okay. Sir, I don't have any other questions. I indicated I would try to be brief, and I hope I achieved that. And thank you very much for your cooperation and

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I, Carolyn J. Hawkes, Certified
Shorthand Reporter within and for the State of
Illinois, do hereby certify that, to-wit, on the
7th day of June, 2024, appeared remotely before me
DARREN HAWKINS, witness produced in a certain
cause now pending and undetermined in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware.

DARREN HAWKINS was by me first remotely duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth in the cause aforesaid; that the testimony then given by said witness was reported stenographically by me, in the presence of the said witness, and afterwards reduced to typewriting; and the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the testimony so given by said witness as aforesaid.

I further certify that the said deposition was adjourned as indicated herein.

I further certify that

Counsel of Record appeared on behalf of the respective parties.

I further certify that I am not

Page 140 counsel for nor in any way related to any of the parties to this cause, nor am I in any way interested in the outcome thereof. In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand this 12th day of June, 2024, A. D. Carolyn J. Hawkes Certified Shorthand Reporter State of Illinois CSR No. 084-003296. 2.2